Operatively White?: Exploring the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness by McFarlane, Audrey G.
MCFARLANE 4/29/2010 3:40:30 PM 
 
OPERATIVELY WHITE?: EXPLORING 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE AND 
CLASS THROUGH THE PARADOX OF 
BLACK MIDDLE-CLASSNESS 
AUDREY G. MCFARLANE* 
“Analytically race and class are theoretically distinct. Realistically in the US they are 
indistinguishable.”1 
“[R]ace is . . . the modality in which class is lived . . . .”2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
No current discussion of race in the United States is complete without 
acknowledging the interaction of race and class. Both are overlapping 
categories of identity that lead to significant, yet often unacknowledged, 
differences in material conditions and life opportunities. But neither category, 
standing on its own, adequately reflects or explains reality.3 Examining these 
categories in tandem reveals that race and class represent interconnected yet 
competing constructs with consequences for the prospects of addressing racial 
segregation and subordination. In particular, society’s unexamined embrace of 
class discrimination reflects the irony that class is both the preferred method for 
and the hidden obstacle to racial justice. 
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 1. Howard Winant, Remarks at the University of California Irvine Race and Law Workshop 
(May 2, 2008). 
 2. Stuart Hall, Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance, in BLACK BRITISH 
CULTURAL STUDIES: A READER 16, 55 (Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara & Ruth H. Lindeborg 
eds., 1996). 
 3. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) (“[T]here is no natural congruence 
between class and racial interests. At different times, class allegiances may follow or cut across race 
lines, and vice versa.”); john a. powell, The Race And Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 
LAW & INEQ. 355, 358 (2007) (“[R]acial practices in the United States help define the meaning and 
development of our understanding, and the practices of class.”); see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT 
COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL 
REFORM 79–80, 182 (2004) (discussing the “property” right of Whiteness, which benefits even poor 
Whites, compared with the persistent racial disadvantage for even highly educated Blacks). 
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Taking race and class into account often means acknowledging that Black 
racial identity combined with poverty leads to enhanced, sometimes nearly 
totalizing, disadvantages. The combination leads to limited life options, a 
degraded or shortened life expectancy, and limits on agency: the ability to make 
choices in one’s own life. Because the black identity is equated with poverty, 
little attention has been paid to the significance for racial-subordination analysis 
of the increasing numbers of Blacks stepping into middle-class roles formerly 
held almost exclusively by Whites. In land use and development, the racialized 
landscape has been created by racism and deliberate segregation of Blacks in 
black communities and Whites in white communities. As affluent Blacks 
become suburbanites and inner-city gentrifiers, they move into positions, 
privileges, and opportunities shaped by this racialized landscape. Ironically, 
their presence may play an inadvertent role in furthering economic 
discrimination that disproportionately disadvantages poor Blacks. The 
movement of affluent Blacks through the racialized landscape raises questions 
for anti-subordination analysis: what happens to subordination when the Black 
identity is combined with comparative affluence and educational attainment? 
What effect does class have on race in this circumstance? If we treat the 
question literally and think of race as a phenotypical matter of heritage and 
color, the answer is obvious; class does not change phenotype.4 Conversely, if 
race is thought of as a context-specific set of structural advantages and 
disadvantages and the extent to which race and class performance is part of 
“doing race and class,” the answer is more complex. It is worth ruminating 
about that this more complex view of race and class comprehends racial stigma 
as well as class advantage and disadvantage. 
Consider the example of gentrification and the concern about its exclusion 
of the poor through displacement. When Whites are gentrifiers, for example, 
the disproportionate racial impact imposed by gentrification on lower-income 
Blacks is visually apparent and suggests that something involving racial 
subordination is taking place. But because of the role of market forces in 
creating hot real estate markets, gentrification is viewed as being about class, 
not about race. The racial lens on gentrification is weakened further by the 
presence of affluent Blacks in the influx of gentrifiers. Their presence suggests 
that Blacks are welcome if they have the money, thus indicating that 
gentrification sounds in class, not race. But changing the race of the gentrifier 
does not necessarily change the racial nature of the problem. The complexity 
 
 4. For a discussion of the different advantages and disadvantages conferred by color, see Taunya 
Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2000); Leonard M. Baynes, 
If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow 
than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (1997); 
Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); see also Arthur H. 
Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton, & William Darity, Jr., From Dark to Light: Skin Color and Wages 
Among African-Americans, 12 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 701 (2007) (demonstrating through empirical 
study that light-skinned blacks who are educated and affluent have income and educational attainment 
measures indistinguishable from Whites). 
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for understanding racial subordination lies in the reality of the mechanics of 
displacement and exclusion: at different decisionmaking junctures, affluent 
Blacks sometimes demonstrate that they have similar incentives to Whites—to 
avoid, run away from, or oppose projects or endeavors that would benefit 
lower-income Blacks. 
Taking race and class into account seems to demand exploration of the 
significance of Blackness and affluence within an existing societal structure that 
has evolved from white supremacy to a seemingly less-virulent, or more-benign, 
white norm—one in which normalcy, wealth, advantage, and presumptions of 
innocence are still implicitly predicated on Whiteness and in which an economic 
structure of white privilege and advantage is inscribed into the geography of the 
physical landscape. Similarly, the vestigial oppression of slavery has evolved to 
a norm of presuming black deviance, lack of wealth, disadvantage, and 
presumptions of guilt; and an economic structure whenever Blackness is 
inscribed on the physical landscape to mean places that are less desirable and to 
be avoided. Using the example of the black middle class, it is possible to see 
that the vestigial oppression of slavery and the domination of white supremacy 
have morphed but have not been eliminated.5 Instead, those institutions have 
been disaggregated into discrete, wealth-based components of Blackness and 
Whiteness. Thus, Blacks with money are privileged in certain limited 
circumstances to be operatively white. Through their wallets and educational or 
professional attainments they gain access to some of the privileges, goods, and 
services formerly reserved exclusively for Whites. 
This access is contingent and sometimes unpredictable. For example, 
consider the experience of Blacks in a place as ubiquitous as the shopping mall. 
Upscale shopping and entertainment has been a central means of local 
economic development. Race and class exclusion is deliberately embedded into 
luxury retail concepts replicated throughout these developments.  The welcome 
to Blacks as mall patrons is contingent and easily dissipated.6  Blacks are 
welcome to the extent they can show they are Blacks with class; that is, that 
they have the money and know how to follow middle-class norms and culture. 
They are also subject to greater surveillance, more onerous credit evaluation for 
 
 5. Consider the campaign and election of Barack Obama. There is no other way to characterize 
his election than as an incredible advancement in the crippling disadvantages of Blackness in the 
United States. On the other hand, it is quite obvious from the racial contortions he executed during the 
campaign, in order not to violate the privilege he had been granted, that he would be considered an 
exception to how Blacks are ordinarily regarded. See John O. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and 
Blackness as Performance: Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 115 (2005) 
(noting wryly that all black professionals are the exception that proves the rule: “We, the new people, do 
not so much represent blacks as we personify the exceptions that prove the rule.”). 
 6. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights 
Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275, 276–78 (2001) (detailing consumer racism in retail environments 
including excessive policing of and disparate security measures towards blacks); see, e.g., Lewis v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 948 F. Supp. 367, 368–69 (D. Del. 1996). See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, 
LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994); Joe Feagin, The Continuing 
Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 102 (1991). 
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financing or payment and dismissive treatment from store clerks regardless of 
whether they are or appear to be affluent.7 
Rather than simply consider the challenges of being black and middle class, 
this article considers challenges and opportunities of Blackness and middle-
classness in its twenty-first century context of being “operatively white.” 
Specifically, how should neighborhood land use conflicts be regarded if poor 
Blacks are disproportionately, negatively affected in relation to affluent Blacks? 
That racialized impact should not be dismissed as being purely about class just 
because the affluent are also black. Problems of class in the United States are 
racialized; they are never separate from the racial structures of subordination 
that still operate here.8 Accordingly, problems currently cognizable as being 
merely about class are necessarily still cognizable as problems of race. 
This article’s goal is to generate discussion about ways to begin to frankly 
approach how we see race vis-à-vis class. The conversation has been diverted by 
attempts in the courts and the media to substitute class for race in affirmative 
action. To stave off those efforts, counter-arguments focus on establishing why 
race and class are distinct yet overlapping categories of identity.9 This article 
focuses on a different aspect of the conversation in order to ensure that both 
race and class are taken into account. Instead of focusing on the disadvantages 
of poverty, this article interrogates the notion of class as the preferred vehicle of 
change and confronts how racial experience is altered or alterable by class 
because of the privileges that class brings? Of course, this is a complex question, 
particularly because the black middle class does not escape the entire burden of 
race. Also, how do we begin to take class into account in a world that is 
increasingly unwilling to even account for race discrimination? If the path to 
racial justice is through the expansion of the black middle class, what are the 
obligations placed upon members of that class within the black–white racial 
discrimination paradigm? Ultimately, taking class into account is part of a more 
sophisticated understanding of how race discrimination is structurally 
embedded in societal and institutional structures and the inadvertent complicity 
of members of the black middle-class participating unquestioningly in those 
structures. 
In order to enrich our ability to give race and class the sophisticated and 
probing account that their complex interaction calls for, this paper takes the 
concept of racialized class to its logical end and explores the ways in which 
racial identity and racial social position are affected by class. Part II recounts 
the specific example of post-Katrina New Orleans and the black-on-black 
conflict in the city–suburban context. Part III looks at how race and class have 
historically been etched into the landscape through explicit support of economic 
segregation in land use and real estate development. Subsequent sections 
 
 7. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 298, 329, 283. 
 8. powell, supra note 3, at 3. 
 9. See, e.g., powell, supra note 3, at 358 (“[R]ace and class are distinct and at the same time 
mutually constitutive, recursive processes in the United States . . . .”). 
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discuss the place and parameters of the black middle class and its ability to use 
material means as a racial and class survival strategy within a white norm of 
“middle classness.” Finally, I discuss ways in which this operative Whiteness has 
significance for racial justice. 
Because race and class are structurally inscribed into the landscape, racial 
justice requires economic liberation in order to advance. Economic liberation 
comes at the expense of the black poor. There cannot be racial justice without 
economic justice. 
II 
INTRARACIAL DISHARMONY: NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 
In Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, thousands of people perished; 
thousands more were stranded; and hundreds of thousands more were displaced 
from the city and region. The devastation of Hurricane Katrina did not just 
reveal the level of black poverty in New Orleans, but it peeled back the veneer 
obscuring both racial and intraracial divergences.10 The need for habitable 
housing post-Katrina, let alone decent and affordable housing, was dire. Yet the 
struggles of race and class were evident in a number of conflicts over land use 
and development relating to who got to rebuild what, where. 
For example, immediately after the disaster, national news stories reported 
the city’s efforts to tear down solidly constructed, 1930s public-housing 
structures in order to redevelop them as mixed-income projects with far fewer 
units.11 A less-noticed, yet striking, news item reported an existing low-income 
housing development that had been destroyed when the levees were breached.12 
The project owner obtained funds relatively quickly at the time to reconstruct 
the housing right away on the same site.13 The housing development happened 
to be located next to another neighborhood, New Orleans East, which is a 
middle- to upper-middle-class black neighborhood comprised primarily of 
professionals.14 
During the land-use-approval process, residents of this black middle-class 
neighborhood strongly opposed rebuilding the project on the original site.15 The 
neighbors’ objections were that the project should not be rebuilt next to their 
 
 10. The traditional racial cleavages were omnipresent. For example, after Katrina, white 
communities surrounding New Orleans passed ordinances limiting rentals to relatives only and barred 
storm victims from crossing a bridge to safety. See David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, 
Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1110–11 (2008) (discussing the 
Gretna Bridge incident and the Jefferson Parish ordinance). 
 11. Leslie Eaton, In New Orleans, Plan to Raze Low-Income Housing Draws Protest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2007, at 28; Adam Nossiter, A Class Struggle over Housing in New Orleans: Poor Tenants 
Oppose Post-Katrina Plans, INT’L. HERALD TRIB., Dec. 27, 2006, at 2. 
 12. Coleman Warner & Leslie Williams, N.O. May Idle Housing in East; Multifamily Sites Worry 
Neighbors, TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 8, 2007, at 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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neighborhood because low-income housing projects had been dis-
proportionately sited near their community. 16 Implicit in their objections was 
the expectation that such projects should be distributed to other areas around 
the city, nearer other, white middle-class neighborhoods. The neighborhood’s 
representatives on the city council introduced and obtained a moratorium on 
the construction of any multifamily housing for a year.17 
Because the need for housing and shelter seemed a real and unavoidable 
emergency, this opposition to the rebuilding was shocking and disheartening. 
Even under ordinary circumstances, the ongoing shortage of affordable housing 
is commonplace and ignored. But in times of stark, sudden disaster, it is less 
easy to ignore the immediacy of acute, human need. Yet the neighborhood’s 
city-council (who led the efforts to adopt the moratorium) viewed the situation 
as involving not only disaster relief, but also civil and property rights.18 It 
involved property-rights issues because as homeowners, the neighborhood 
residents had the right to protect their property from incompatible land uses 
like low-income, multifamily housing. As for civil rights, public and other low-
income housing projects had long been relegated to border black middle-class 
neighborhoods, while distant white neighborhoods were protected from such 
encroachments.19 White neighborhoods were, for the same reason, protected 
from group homes, homeless shelters, toxic dumps, and other land uses 
seemingly inimical to the health and desirability of middle-class neighborhoods. 
These had instead been disproportionately located near black neighborhoods.20 
How should the New Orleans East neighborhood’s moratorium be 
interpreted? How did the apartment dwellers’ being poor and black play into 
the neighborhood opposition?21 Can the homeowners’ motivation be seen as 
qualitatively different than that of a similarly situated white community that 
might oppose a similar project using zoning rules? What of the fact that the 
neighborhood and the other members of the black middle class have been 
disproportionately subject to close placements of public housing and other low-
income housing—that zoning has racialized and classed multifamily housing as 
 
 16. Id. For a description of a similar conflict, see also Leonard Moore, Class Conflict over 
Residential Space in an African American Community: Cleveland’s Lee-Seville Public Housing 
Controversy, 111 OH. HIST. 25 (2002). 
 17. Bruce Eggler, East N.O. Apartment Dispute Rages on; New Limits May Pass Legal Test, 
Council Told, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 25, 2007, at 1. 
 18. Brian Thevenot, Displaced Voices: Two Cynthias—Willard-Lewis and Hedge-Morrell—Find 
Themselves as City Council Members Representing Virtual Ghost Towns, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 29, 
2006, at 1. 
 19. MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE 
BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 6 (1999) (noting that racial segregation places black, middle-class 
neighborhoods near or next to black, poor neighborhoods). 
 20. See Troutt, supra note 10, at 1129–31. 
 21. Other examples are disproportionate siting of group homes in black neighborhoods. See, e.g., 
Gladden v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 659 A.2d 249, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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black and poor?22 Can this issue be seen simply as homeowners’ asserting their 
claim to the full panoply of suburban property rights that white suburban 
property owners take for granted? If so, the argument is that it should be their 
right to escape from disadvantage23— that they are only trying to protect their 
property and way of life from low-income land uses that happen to be for the 
benefit of Blacks. It is not because of race; it is because of class. 
The increased presence of Blacks in the suburbs illustrates not merely an 
intraracial class disjuncture, but also the disjuncture between our understanding 
of race and our apparent unawareness of the invidiousness of class. Black 
suburban homeowners are now turf defenders. They are merely doing what 
white middle-class homeowners do—pressure local land-use powers to keep out 
undesirables. Thus when Blacks attain racial equality, does it mean they attain 
the right to exercise unfettered class privilege? 
III 
THE ROLE OF CLASS IN THE RACIALIZED STRUCTURE OF LAND USE24 
“More than any other issue facing our nation, housing will be the concern that will 
force citizens to face the reality of class.”25 
One of the more-intractable aspects of racism today is the spatial inscription 
of race and class on the landscape. The disadvantages of class structures are 
embedded in land-use practices and law. These patterns of land use created 
through zoning and local government boundaries provide the opportunity to 
examine racial consequences of economic discrimination via segregation and 
homogeneity. The geography of race and class shapes our lives—where we live, 
our life opportunities, and our daily interactions. This geography is visible, yet 
we are so used to seeing it that we accept it as normal. It has thick boundaries, 
with thin and flexible, yet exceedingly effective, mechanisms of enforcement.26 
 
 22. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 258 (1977); 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 
488 U.S. 15 (1988). For the history of racial discrimination and public housing, see Michelle Adams, 
Separate and Unequal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing 
Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 447 (1996). 
 23. See STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE MORAL 
PANIC OVER THE CITY 37, 199–200, 257–62 (2006) (discussing how filmmakers, advertisers, and 
journalists contributed to the morally decayed, violent image of the inner city—the invention of the 
“savage urban Other”—in the popular imagination). 
 24. Under current laws, these conflicts are race problems, not problems of class. It is now 
acknowledged that a big gap in the Fair Housing Act’s protections was its emphasis on race, when, in 
fact, a theme of class discrimination can be viewed as effectively protecting racial discrimination. See 
Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live— Class and the Limitations of Fair Housing Law, 35 URB. 
LAW. 399 (2003). 
 25. BELL HOOKS, CLASS MATTERS 140 (2001). 
 26. GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 148 (2003) (“[N]eighborhoods have established borders that serve to 
constrain the gentrifying housing market and thus constrain the supply of houses and allow gentrifiers 
to capture the externality effects of each other’s actions for themselves.”); see also HOOKS, supra note 
25, at 132–35 (discussing the sensitivity to color in neighborhoods and real estate). 
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The class aspect of the race–class matrix in land use is an inadequately told 
story; class subordination in land use is powerful and complicated. The class 
story in the United States is distinct from yet intertwined with race. The two 
cannot be separated because conceptions and definitions of class have been, 
and continue to be, deeply racialized in the United States, both as a matter of 
social structure and as a matter of identity.27 
The problematic class structure of land use involves as well an idealized 
vision of family life through the single-family home. Because the norm of the 
single-family home has been so successfully protected, resulting economic 
segregation has been normalized to the point that few question it. The 
consequences of the rules and policies allowing the pursuit of single-family-
home districts are evident in the landscape in the form of urban sprawl, traffic, 
and environmental degradation. The social effects are mostly invisible because 
the social understanding is that money is the means to one’s piece of the single-
family pie. The customs and practices of economic segregation are considered 
normal and natural. Even though such customs and practices give rise to urban 
sprawl and disconnected landscapes, require driving everywhere, and do not 
necessarily serve daily human needs very well, we accept them as the norm. 
The primary legal tool of land-use control—zoning—ratifies separating uses 
based on economic homogeneity. One of the most salient, common, and 
recurring cases of discrimination in land use has been zoning discrimination 
against multifamily housing. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.28 in 1926 enshrined such economic segregation as a 
legitimate use of the police power with great implications for perpetuating 
racial segregation. The Court upheld the right of localities to zone for certain 
purposes, with the understanding that, in creating a hierarchy of favored and 
disfavored land uses, the single-family residential home would be at the apex in 
the pyramid of residential protection.29 By contrast, multifamily housing, 
apartment houses, low-cost housing, or any other kind of multiple dwelling 
would be inferior to, and considered incompatible with, single-family residential 
housing.30 The apartments of the day were usually overcrowded, poorly built 
tenement housing, which the Court considered repugnant and hazardous to 
health. The social context of the Euclid era is also one in which zoning was 
viewed as a way to protect the upper middle class homeowner from the 
encroachments of urban life including congestion, noise and undesirable people: 
 
 27. See Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status In American Law: Race, Interest, and The Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) (arguing that class is misconstrued as identity 
when it really is a reflection of social status and power relations). 
 28. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 29. See Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing The Cathedral From Behind The Color Line: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism , 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1862–63 (2004) (discussing the zoning 
pyramid that created a hierarchy that was the most protective of residential districts and least 
protective of industrial districts. Existing black residential areas were classified as industrial districts 
with the least protection from uses incompatible with residential use.). 
 30. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394–95. 
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the poor, immigrants and blacks.31 The Court characterized apartments as 
nuisance-like land uses and held they were thus properly regulated through 
exclusion if the municipality deemed it proper.32 
After Euclid, “segregation of multiple-family dwellings became an accepted 
fact.”33 Euclid, in effect, enshrined economic discrimination and economic 
privilege within localities’ legal zoning power, and that legacy is now 
unquestioned as desirable, normal, and unproblematic. Euclid continues to be 
the basis upon which local governments can, by facially neutral rules, make 
zoning decisions that have a discriminatory effect. Euclid dilutes any racial-
discrimination claim, particularly one based on impact, because it would be 
negated by the rational alternative explanation of class discrimination. In other 
words, racial-discrimination claims in this arena are eclipsed by the rationality 
of cities’ choices to exclude housing that might conflict with existing residents’ 
preferences. 
The lower-court opinion, overruled by Euclid, explicitly acknowledged the 
race and class implications presented by zoning. It expressed concern that the 
effect of zoning would be to ratify class discrimination by allowing arbitrary 
discrimination against types of land use favored, out of necessity, by the non-
affluent:34 
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the 
property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a straight-jacket. The purpose 
to be accomplished is really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may 
hereafter inhabit it. In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the 
population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life.35 
The Supreme Court was aware that zoning was economically discriminatory, 
yet it ultimately chose to privilege and normalize such class-based exclusion. By 
upholding the ability of municipalities to distinguish and separate types of 
residential uses based on building type, Euclid can be thought of as the Plessy v. 
 
 31. See Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 604 (2001) 
(“[I]mages about race, immigration and poverty were central parts of the Euclid litigation itself.”). 
 32. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (“[In single-family residential areas,] apartment houses . . . come very 
near to being nuisances.”). 
 33. Richard F. Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1040, 1048 (1963); see also EDWARD C. BANFIELD & MORTON GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT 
AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 71–92 (1958) (discussing the wisdom of economic 
segregation); Norman Williams, Jr., Land Planning in a Democracy: Planning Law and Democratic 
Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317, 343–48 (1955) (discussing the constitutionality of economic 
segregation). 
    34. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1924) (invalidating zoning 
ordinance as taking without due process of law); see Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? 
Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over Zoning for Exclusively 
Private Residential Areas, 1916–1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367 (1994); see also David D. Troutt, 
Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1147–66 
(2008) (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine has enabled localism to become “the Instrumental 
Successor to Segregation”). 
 35. Euclid, 297 F. at 316; see Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant against a black homebuyer in a 
Washington, D.C. neighborhood). 
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Ferguson36 of land-use law: multifamily housing affordable to lower- and 
moderate-income people was kept separate and unequal. This separation, 
benefitting the idealized middle- and upper-income people, contributed to the 
racialized regime of class discrimination that exists to this day. 
Other Supreme Court cases reaffirmed protection for middle-class property 
rights. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas37 explicitly used idealized imagery of the 
suburban community of single-family homes to affirm a town’s right to use 
blood relationships to define who may live in a town.38 In Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (“Arlington Heights I”),39 a 
town with a 99.9 percent white population, rejected a nonprofit housing-
development group’s application to rezone a parcel of land to build a 
townhouse development that would have been affordable and racially 
integrated.40 Though the “social” issue played a factor at public hearings 
considering the application, these vague expressions of possible racial prejudice 
failed to meet the Court’s strict standard of proof in intentional racial-
discrimination cases.41 Under a Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim, 
disparate racial impact can help establish intentional racial discrimination, but it 
is, and in Arlington Heights I was, insufficient standing on its own. The strict 
standard meant that unless a zoning board or town council explicitly stated that 
the purpose of the adverse zoning decision was due to the race of the applicant 
or to the racial identity of the potential residents, any zoning denial would 
withstand Equal Protection challenge. In the ordinary case, a town seeking to 
keep a zoning district or the entire town zoned only for single-family housing 
would be protected if the existing zoning scheme and policy were consistent.42 
The respondent’s appellate brief submitted to the Court reveals, however, that 
the “social” issue discussed at the town’s public hearings was race and that some 
council members felt duty-bound to follow the will of the citizens.43 Thus, 
Arlington Heights I affirmed the legal entitlement of towns and cities to practice 
exclusionary zoning, regardless of its discriminatory effects on Blacks, so long as 
intent could not be proven.44 Most significantly, the decision reaffirmed the right 
 
 36. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 37. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 38. Id. at 9 (“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are 
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.”). 
 39. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 40. Id. at 255, 257. 
 41. Id. at 257, 269. 
 42. Similar examples are towns that have required popular referendums to allow multifamily 
housing in a jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 
(2003) (affirming the use of the referendum). 
 43. Brief for Respondent at 16–17, Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 292 
(1977) (No. 75-616). 
 44. In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (“Arlington 
Heights II”), 558 F. 2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), on remand for review under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 
the result was different. Under the FHA, an independent disparate-impact or discriminatory-effects 
argument was available to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1290. The town was 
found to be in violation of the FHA although the court observed that it considered the matter to have 
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for suburban residents to establish a system of zoning that would prevent the 
poor from ever taking up residence within the suburbanites’ town. Even though 
it was clear that the class discrimination was motivated by race, class effectively 
obscured—and ratified—the racial injustice. 
The logic of the U.S. class structure is full of racial meaning.45 Because the 
class structure is raced, the racial implications of zoning are clear. Cases that 
overtly recognized and effectively locked in class discrimination were 
undoubtedly influenced by the racialized social context. Even when the Court 
intervened to prevent more-flagrant attempts to legalize segregation via land-
use regulation , the Court’s logic reflected the justices’ views of the racial 
order—that white was supreme. For example, at the turn of the twentieth 
century, many municipalities, starting with Baltimore and moving south, 
adopted racial zoning ordinances that dictated which zoning districts were to be 
white and which districts were to be black.46 A white purchaser could not 
purchase in a black district and a black purchaser could not purchase in a white 
district. In Buchanan v. Warley,47 the Supreme Court invalidated Louisville, 
Kentucky’s racial zoning ordinance that designated residential zoning districts 
based on the race of a majority of residents.48 Decided during the Plessy era, 
Buchanan result was groundbreaking but its reasoning was troubling. In 
invalidating racial zoning, the Court focused mainly on the ordinance’s 
impairment of white citizens’ freedom to contract and ability to buy and sell 
property in any district: 
[C]an a white man be denied, consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose 
of his property to a purchaser by prohibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason 
that the purchaser is a person of color intending to occupy the premises as a place of 
residence?49 
The Court seemed to decide that such a racial restriction on the ability to 
buy and sell property exceeded any legitimate interest on behalf of the city in 
 
been a close case. Id. at 1293–94. The standard under Arlington Heights II continues to this day to be 
one of two competing analytical standards for FHA disparate-impact claims. The other is found in 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 
(1988) (per curiam), in which a less-stringent disparate-impact standard is applied. Nevertheless, very 
few other successful exclusionary zoning cases have been brought under the FHA. 
 45. See powell, supra note 3, at 358 (“Racial meaning, identity, and practices have helped shape 
class identity and inhibit class consciousness.”). 
 46. Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning, in URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23–42 (June Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 
1997). 
 47. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 78. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 80–81 (2004) (noting that concerns of racial 
equality played no role in cases like Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), which was instead 
concerned about property rights); Warren B. Hunting, Constitutionality of Race Distinctions and the 
Baltimore Negro Segregation Ordinance, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 34 (1911) (arguing that the Baltimore 
racial zoning ordinance was equally fair to Blacks and Whites). 
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general or on behalf of any white residents individually.50 The constitutional 
impact of the case was therefore relatively limited by its focus on direct, explicit, 
intentional racial exclusion—it was this narrow category of extreme restriction 
that was, and is, absolutely prohibited. Buchanan was effective in banning only 
that narrow type of racial zoning that arose briefly in cities like Louisville, 
Atlanta, and Baltimore, with increased Black migration and Eastern and 
Southern European immigration. But Buchanan did nothing to discourage or 
prohibit other, less explicit, exclusions such as zoning and racially-restrictive 
covenants or even outright racial discrimination in the refusal to sell to 
Blacks.fa 
The racial context at the time is apparent in other cases that identified how 
Blacks were regarded and how the migration of Blacks led to litigation over 
attempts to exclude them from certain neighborhoods. For example, the district 
court in Euclid thought that Buchanan proved that zoning in general should be 
invalidated.51 The court reasoned that the practice of municipal zoning could not 
possibly be upheld when racial zoning had been invalidated in Buchanan. To 
the Euclid district court, racial zoning had far greater factual justifications: 
[N]o gift of second sight is required to foresee that if th[e] statute had been sustained 
[in Buchanan], its provisions would have spread from city to city throughout the 
length and breadth of the land. And it is equally apparent that the next step in the 
exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions for the purpose of 
segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived immigrants. The blighting 
of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the colored races or 
certain foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be within 
judicial cognizance.52 
Other land-use decisions include statements made, almost in passing, that 
indicate how much of the racial order was based on white supremacy and black 
undesirability and inferiority.53 Similarly, a number of private land-use 
techniques were also utilized in order to perpetuate the racial order. Racially 
restrictive covenants were a popular and accepted practice following the 
invalidation of explicitly racial zoning.54 Shelley v. Kraemer55 used the state-
 
 50. For a discussion of a similar refusal to extend legally sanctioned racial discrimination into 
otherwise racially neutral common-law doctrine, see generally Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The 
Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2006). 
 51. See Richard Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 604 (2001) 
(“[I]mages about race, immigration and poverty were central parts of the Euclid litigation itself,” 
Chused argues that Euclid used code words to get the otherwise conservative Supreme Court to uphold 
zoning by appealing to upper middle-class sensibilities about protecting house and home by excluding 
nuisances in the form of apartment housing used by poor immigrants and people of color from single 
family enclaves.). Id. 
 52. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d on other grounds, 272 
U.S. 365 (1926). 
 53. For an example of racially disparaging statements intended to be affirmative made in cases, see 
Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292 (1883) (rejecting a cause of action for nuisance against a house 
occupied by Blacks because they were not “worthless negroes”). 
 54. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 217 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (holding that the Fifth and Thirteenth 
Amendments do not prohibit “private individuals from entering into contracts respecting the control 
and disposition of their own property”); see also Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of 
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action doctrine to invalidate enforcement of such private covenants, but in 
doing so, the Court inadvertently continued to privilege white racism. By 
resting the decision on the public–private distinction and merely prohibiting 
state enforcement, the Court failed to stop the private racial discrimination 
perpetrated by tacit homeowner compliance with racially restrictive covenants. 
The land-use cases have to be understood in a context of local practices and 
assumptions around class, racial homogeneity, and property values—all of 
which are embedded in our system of property valuation. What is often missing 
from the discussion of this context is a focus on how race- and class 
discrimination is structured into processes that support property markets, 
ownership, and financing.56 Class discrimination, embedded in the basic logic of 
zoning, legally perpetuates a system of segregation and inequity in which black 
neighborhoods and white neighborhoods constitute separate property markets. 
One current assumption is that economic segregation happens naturally 
because land values are higher in wealthier neighborhoods, so economically 
appropriate uses are sorted by purchasers’ willingness and ability to pay. That 
reasoning is fallacious. The real class-discrimination issue behind zoning is that 
without it 
wealthy residents of a neighborhood could not exclude poorer residents through the 
simple mechanism of high land values, because the latter could always afford to move 
into such districts by renting apartments built there. So long as those apartments 
generated sufficient rent, high land values did not act as a barrier. Wealthy residents 
sought protection in zoning ordinances creating areas in which only single-family 
homes could be built.57 
The logic of Euclid is naked protection against the inability to exclude 
“undesirables” from neighborhoods with high land values. But for zoning, high 
land values do not naturally exclude affordable housing. Economic segregation 
would not occur nearly to the level it does today absent intervention by the law 
of zoning. 
Of course, the class structure reflected in zoning cannot really be separated 
from the racial structure of land use and a history of intentional racial 
segregation, for these overlay and intermingle with class concerns. Efforts in 
support of racial segregation worked in tandem with Euclid’s ratification of 
class discrimination. Consistent with this history, the Federal Housing 
Administration encouraged the use of racially restrictive covenants to promote 
 
the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 739 (1989) (arguing that the 
great migration of southern rural Blacks to northern cities prompted the popularity of racially 
restrictive covenants). 
 55. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 56. See Kenneth Fox, The Suspectness of Wealth: Another Look At State Constitutional 
Adjudication of School Finance Inequalities, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1155–56 (1994) (arguing that 
commentators have mistakenly downplayed the fact that state courts in California, New Jersey, and 
eight additional states—Connecticut, Wyoming, West Virginia, Arkansas, Washington, Kentucky, 
Montana, and Texas—have actually invalidated school finance systems for wealth discrimination, 
grounding these holdings under either equal-protection or state educational provisions). 
 57. STUART, supra note 26, at 37. 
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a discriminatory vision of what was considered necessary to promote stable, 
desirable, white middle-class neighborhoods.58 When Shelley v. Kraemer merely 
invalidated these covenants under the state-action doctrine, it treated racial 
discrimination in decisions about where to live, and whom to buy from and sell 
to as private matters; it left racial discrimination in individual transactions to 
continue legally unaddressed for another twenty years until the Fair Housing 
Act was passed.59 The discriminatory combination of government policy and 
individual actions by white homeowners, realtors, and appraisers was aided and 
reinforced by the protections of economically segregative zoning rules.60 The 
resulting rate of racial segregation in the United States has been quite high; 
racially integrated neighborhoods continue to be an anomaly. Racial 
segregation indices have improved, but only slightly, and primarily in areas with 
military installations, which tend to be more integrated.61 
Racial geography shapes lives and life’s opportunities: we rely on the 
resulting segregated racial geography to make our decisions about where to 
live. Racially identified places lead to distinctly different economic conditions in 
terms of prices, quality of schools, shopping, and other services.62 These 
differences also play a role in wealth allocations—markets for real estate are 
racialized and discounted or overvalued accordingly. Middle-class 
neighborhoods will receive a racial premium or discount based on race.63 
Schools and services will be better in and near white neighborhoods and worse 
in and near black neighborhoods.64 
The most palpable evidence of the racially segregative effect of class 
discrimination has traditionally been the city–suburb divide: the mid-twentieth 
century’s visible, racialized boundary in the geography of desired places and 
places of last resort.65 The fifty-year trend of suburbanization has been 
countered recently with a trend toward moving back to the cities. The new 
 
 58. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 208 (1985). 
 59. Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631). 
 60. See Martha R. Mahoney, Shaping American Communities: Segregation, Housing and the Urban 
Poor, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1670–75 (1995). 
 61. See POLLY J. SMITH, THE IMPACT OF MILITARY DESEGREGATION ON SEGREGATION 
PATTERNS IN AMERICAN CITIES: A CASE STUDY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, NEW LONDON AND 
FAYETTEVILLE (2007). 
 62. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 174–75 (2004). 
 63. See Margalynn Armstrong, Protecting Privilege: Race, Residence And Rodney King, 12 LAW & 
INEQ. 351 (1993); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994). 
 64. See CASHIN, supra note 62, at 132–36. A similar black-on-black class conflict example could 
also be made with schools. Conflicts between the Blacks divided by class have also centered around 
public schools. In Prince George’s County, middle-class Blacks have fought to have poor Blacks not 
attend schools near their homes. Id. at 136. 
 65. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1995) (discussing racial segregation and poverty 
indices in metropolitan areas with inelastic central cities). 
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housing and commercial developments built to accommodate both trends tend 
to be projects that are economically exclusive.66 Any resulting racial segregation 
or exclusion of Blacks is normalized on the rationale that it is acceptably 
unavoidable: those with the money are welcome for the most part to partake in 
the “new inner city.” Today’s city–suburb divide has shifted from declining 
inner-ring suburbs’ to “exurbs,” and to glittering shopping and entertainment 
centers—racial segregation continues altered but unabated. New techniques of 
racialized exclusion have been added. For example, credit-scoring practices, 
today’s objective technique for measuring an individual’s credit, perpetuate 
race- and class discrimination because racial and economic segregation are 
embedded in our system of credit-worthiness measures.67 Credit is used to 
maintain a racial order. For example, Blacks are more likely to suffer 
discrimination if they apply for a large loan to purchase property in a white 
neighborhood.68 
The result is that the race and class structure of cities and suburbs has 
largely set up the suburbs as the place to escape from disadvantage. Local 
governments respond by offering a variety of services and amenities to appeal 
to different constituencies who vote with their feet to select those environments 
that best meet their needs.69 Some argue that homeowners are rationally 
invested in their neighborhoods.70 In response to the acknowledged success that 
suburban (white) neighborhoods have had in keeping out the poor (and often 
black), some have suggested that mandatory, inclusionary zoning be paired with 
equity-compensation funds that would reimburse property owners for any 
financial loss in property values attributable to such economically integrative 
schemes.71 Ironically, a strong contrast between city and suburb helps enhance 
the value of the suburbs. Because the blight of the inner city is a part of 
measuring the contrast between city and suburb,72 the depression in the city 
contributes to the value in the suburbs. 
Another example of the impact of class and race on the urban–suburban 
geography is illustrated by gentrification. Through resurgent demand for city 
 
 66. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 
VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (arguing that developers perpetuate segregation and avoid antidiscrimination 
laws by offering amenities that exclude by price and by signal the development’s demographic 
makeup). 
 67. STUART, supra note 26, at 205. 
 68. See Stephen R. Holloway, Exploring the Neighborhood Contingency of Race Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending in Columbus, Ohio, 88 ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 
GEOGRAPHERS 252 (1998). See generally MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND 
FEDERAL POLICY (John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996) (illustrating substantial racial disparities in 
ability to obtain mortgages and home insurance). 
 69. See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
 70. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 5 (2001) (“[C]oncern 
for home values is the central motivator of local government behavior.”). 
 71. Id. at 270. 
 72. See Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1276–77 (2006). 
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living, gentrification was a comparatively smaller, but significant, counter-trend 
to the classic meaning of the city–suburb divide. Although the racial impact of 
displacement was disproportionate, the trend’s stark dynamic of exclusion was 
perceived to be about class and not about race. The debate over gentrification 
has been largely subdued, largely ineffectual. The demographics of the influx 
are most simply referred to as “the return of the creative class” (a contested 
term and concept nonetheless descriptive and thus useful) who had purchasing 
power. The sense of market dominance, runaway property values, and racial 
change were seen as desirable and as the inevitable result of organic market 
conditions. 
Behind the scenes, however, techniques for commercial real-estate 
development and financing rely on scientific techniques of geodemography that 
classify neighborhoods based on race, income, housing type, and educational 
attainment to decide where to develop and what types of shopping structures to 
place in a neighborhood.73 The system of real-estate appraisals, which uses the 
racial identity of a neighborhood to come up with property valuations, also 
contributes to maintaining a race and class order. Real-estate appraisers are key 
players in making gentrification possible. Although explicit racial criteria are no 
longer officially part of the profession, one appraiser confessed, “We’re not 
supposed to consider race at all. But it’s something you just know as a fact, you 
just can’t include it in the [written appraisal].”74 Real-estate appraisers’ 
definitions, methods, and practices also further racialized urban development 
through promoting uniform building types (and uniform building values within 
districts). Fundamentally, the logic of such uniformity embodies an assumption 
about homogeneity: property is appraised according to the value of similar 
properties; the fewer comparables there are, the harder it is to define the 
market.  But appraisers conspire to make such a market using racial identity. 
In gentrifying city neighborhoods, the process typically starts with one 
(typically white) gentrifier, a “pioneer” who fixes up a house in a black 
neighborhood. From the racialized perspective of the appraiser, there are no 
real comparables against which to measure (and elevate) the value of the house. 
The appraiser will look to another area nearby to find another white gentrifier 
who has fixed up a house and use that house as the basis to measure and elevate 
the property value. Thus, once Whites venture into a neighborhood to gentrify, 
racial geography is gerrymandered to support rising property values.75 
A little-acknowledged complication of race and class arises in places like 
Harlem and Fort Greene, New York; Kenwood-Oakland and Bronzeville in 
Chicago; Oakland, California; and East Atlanta, Georgia. There, members of 
 
 73. Simon Parker, Emma Uprichard, & Roger Burrows, Class Places and Place Classes: 
Geodemographics and the Spatialization of Class, 10 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 902 (2007). 
 74. Stuart, supra note 26, at 142. 
 75. See STUART, supra note 26, at 148–49 (2004) (describing the process by which appraisers and 
real-estate brokers engage in boundary-setting between newly desirable and undesirable 
neighborhoods to create hot markets and rising property values). 
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the black middle class have a substantial presence among the white gentrifiers. 
In each case, there was a large black community prior to the wave of 
gentrification; after gentrification,, the community is more racially and 
economically mixed, with many more white, affluent people seeking residence.76 
Though fewer neighborhood residents are lower-income Blacks, there is still a 
racial mix; any racial displacement will have been offset, in part, by the influx of 
affluent Blacks. Currently, this is not viewed as a racial problem, but purely a 
class problem. Why? The answer is that no racial discrimination is intended, so 
any racially discriminatory impact77 is perceived to be “by accident.” Who are 
the black middle-class gentrifiers?78 They are invaders whose affluence and 
consumption preferences contribute to rising rents and potential displacement 
for existing residents who live in non-rent-controlled or non-rent-stabilized 
apartments.79  The effects of property markets make this so, regardless of good 
intentions. Thus, the shop owners with small businesses have no protection at 
all from displacement due to rising rents or exercises of eminent domain. Or are 
the new residents simply long-lost members of the black community returning 
home, lending their presence, expertise, and material resources to the benefit of 
the community? They have simply exercised a preference to spatially join a 
black community that was black before their arrival and is still black afterward. 
Their acts of reclaiming the black neighborhood represents the ideal of 
everything Blacks have aspired to by increasing educational attainment and 
access to well-paid occupations. The black American dream has always 
mirrored the American dream: property ownership and a comfortable place and 
community to call one’s own. 
 
 76. john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them The Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and 
The K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers Of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 436–39 (2003). 
 77. See Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933–35 (2d Cir. 1988) (adopting 
and explaining the disparate impact standard for proof of racial discrimination in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act). 
 78. See generally LANCE FREEMAN, THERE GOES THE HOOD: VIEWS OF GENTRIFICATION FROM 
THE GROUND UP (2006) (highlighting the different perspectives on gentrification held by Harlem 
residents); Jacqueline Olvera, Book Review, 30 J. URB. AFF. 106 (2008) (reviewing DAVID 
MAURRASSE, LISTENING TO HARLEM: GENTRIFICATION, COMMUNITY, AND BUSINESS (2006)) 
(“[N]eighborhood revitalization often occurs with little effort made to ‘economically empower’ local 
residents . . . especially those who have lived faithfully through the highs and lows of neighborhood 
change. Focusing on development policies in Harlem, Maurrasse argues that even though the Upper 
Manhattan Empowerment Zone (UMEZ) program was intended to reinvigorate commercial activity it 
failed to help the long-standing African-American community. According to Maurrasse, the UMEZ’s 
principal flaw is the lack of balance in its execution. Specifically, development choices made for Harlem 
seem to favor corporate retailers over small businesses that continue to lack adequate access to 
financial resources.”). 
 79. See generally Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification 
and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23 (2006) (responding to empirical 
studies suggesting the poor are not displaced by gentrification). 
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IV 
INTRARACIAL DISHARMONY: HARLEM, NEW YORK 
At a community meeting to discuss gentrification and the impact on cultural 
institutions in Harlem, the predominant tone is not critical and complaining, as 
one might have expected, but excited and celebratory. There is a new Harlem—
safer, more prosperous, more desirable; more integrated, with Whites and black 
professionals joining the black and Latino residents. Something has changed. 
The number of white residents is higher. The affluent profile is enhanced. Is it 
simply class change?  
Despite residents’ enthusiasm, the upscale revival of Harlem revealed a 
newly visible disjuncture within the black community respecting neighborhoods 
and schools. But this disjuncture of the disparate benefits and harms of 
development has long been a theme in popular and sociological literature. 
Playwright August Wilson’s last work in his chronicle of the black American 
twentieth-century experience, Radio Golf,80 revolves around an economic-
development scheme in a historically black community in Pittsburgh.81 Wilson 
uses the proposed scheme and an old dilapidated house as vehicles to explore 
the class-based cleavages within the black community.82 On the one side is a 
neighborhood maven’s great-grandnephew, a wealthy professional and mayoral 
candidate who wants to bring development to the neglected black 
neighborhood.83 On the other side are existing residents without much money, 
education, or status, but with much life experience, who would like to remain in 
their homes and community.84 It becomes clear that progress means leaving 
them out and behind.85 Blacks are disproportionately affected, but because 
there is no discriminatory intent, society accepts the change as natural. Blacks 
with cash are welcome. 
A racial analysis is highly relevant to displacement through gentrification 
because poor people of color are always more likely to be victims of 
displacement.86 Yet a racial critique of gentrification is inadequate so long as we 
view Blacks as monolithic and fail to consider what to do about class privilege 
within a context of racial subordination.87 The unacknowledged reality is that 
 
 80. August Wilson, Radio Golf, New York: Theatre Communications Group, Inc., 2007. 
 81. Id. at 6. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 76 (detailing an argument between wealthy black developer and working-class 
resident over impact of class on racial identity and behavior). 
 83. Id. at 6, 65–66. 
 84. Id. at 68 (Redevelopment requires tearing down all existing buildings or as one character 
observes, “We might as well turn them apartment houses over to the projects.”). 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 63 (discussing redevelopment plan centered around luxury apartments and 
upscale neighborhood retail: Whole Foods, Starbucks and Barnes & Noble). 
 86. See generally FREEMAN, supra note 78. 
 87. See generally Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support 
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 257 (2002) (discussing “hybrid 
intersectionality”: the dilemma of individuals who are both burdened by a subordinating characteristic 
and personally advantaged by other aspects of their identity). Ehrenreich argues that “on the one hand, 
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gentrification capitalizes on racial segregation’s being embedded in the real-
estate market: in development, property valuation and finance. Racially 
subordinating property decisions seem to coincide with valuing property higher 
where blacks are not located and usually result in displacing the poor people of 
color who reside in the segregated neighborhood. This result cannot be seen 
purely as a market phenomenon.88 The racial change that typifies gentrification 
brings the invisible, behind-the-scenes processes to the fore. Black being 
replaced by white is the classic paradigm for racial subordination. But the 
increasing economic heterogeneity of Blacks allows the discriminatory-impact 
argument to be negated. When Blacks are present in the displacing group, any 
racial change is considered purely incidental. In either case, however, Blacks of 
moderate income are disparately affected; only, now, class is used not only to 
do the work that race used to do, but to excuse it. 
Thus, just as geography is racialized, racial differences also measure 
expectations for economic and social status and their attendant advantages and 
disadvantages: who gets to seize advantage and escape disadvantage is raced. 
Escape requires strategic tools to navigate the boundaries (both legal, such as 
zoning, and financial, as from property costs) of the racially stratified landscape. 
When those with the tools are black and when the tools are instrumental in 
displacing and excluding other Blacks, paradoxically, these affluent Blacks are 
not solving the racial problem; they may be perpetuating it. 
V 
EXPLORING THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF BEING AND DOING BLACK MIDDLE 
CLASS 
We, the new people, [black professionals] do not so much represent blacks as we 
personify the exceptions that prove the rule.89 
The significance of a black middle class, and the nature and quality of their 
class advantages and disadvantages, is complex. Blacks have advanced 
significantly in terms of education, employment, and income.90 Home-ownership 
rates have increased as well.91 Nevertheless, the black middle class lags behind 
its white counterpart along a number of measures. For example, though the 
 
hybrid intersectionality sometimes enables singly burdened individuals or groups to dilute the effect of 
their low status by engaging in compensatory acts of subordination against others. But, on the other 
hand, such acts, might also, paradoxically, increase the vulnerability of those engaging in them, making 
it more difficult for them to resist their own oppression.” Id. at 291. 
 88. See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2006). 
 89. John Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: Status Protest from the 
Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 115 (2005). 
 90. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Can We Live Together? Racial Preferences and Neighborhood 
Outcomes, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA 45, 48 (Xavier De Souza Briggs ed., 2005). 
 91. john a. powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act At 40, 18 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 145, 147–48 (2009) (noting that as of 2000, black 
homeownership rates have increased from approximately thirty percent to nearly fifty percent). 
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overall U.S. home-ownership rate is 68%, Blacks’ and Hispanics’ rate is only 
48%, while Whites have a rate of 74%.92 And white homeowners are 
significantly more geographically dispersed than are minorities.93 
[E]ven when there are substantial improvements to the economic status of minorities, 
their urban settlement patterns remain more concentrated than those of whites. While 
black households in each of the sampled metropolitan areas record significant 
homeownership gains in the wake of marked improvements to their economic status, 
those gains are less evidenced in outlying suburban areas.94 
This segregation leads to lower land values, less money for public education, 
reductions in school quality, and fewer commercial amenities located in and 
around black segregated neighborhoods. Thus, middle class black persons are 
still suffering from highly-disadvantageous segregation. Black versus white rates 
of homeownership and settlement patterns aside, the odd interaction of race 
and class in antidiscrimination analysis is also significant in the context of the 
hidden geographical relationship between the black poor and the black middle 
class. That relationship is complicated by these factors: First, black “middle 
class-ness” is a significantly less-wealthy and less-privileged status than that of 
middle-class Whites. Second, many members of the black middle class often live 
very close to the black poor.95 Third, middle-class Blacks are often class 
pioneers: they were not born and raised in the middle class. Pioneers have to 
learn or seek to learn new class practices. The black middle class does not equal 
the white middle class in terms of assets. Nevertheless, many Blacks have 
always had middle-class values, even when poor. But it is the middle-class 
consciousness, coupled with purchasing power, that counts. 
Another difficulty with exploring class is that we all “do” class. In so many 
ways, we live and benefit by economic discrimination or economic segregation. 
The ability to identify and categorize oneself based on class is an integral part of 
 
 92. Stuart Gabriel & Gary Painter, Mobility, Residential Location, and the American Dream: The 
Intra-Metropolitan Geography of Minority Homeownership: Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington 
D.C., Report to the National Association of Realtors 1 (Mar. 2004), available at http:// 
www.novoco.com/homeownership/resource_files/reports/LUSK_043004.pdf (analyzing the geography 
of household mobility by race and showing that notwithstanding “substantial upward gains in economic 
status and homeownership for blacks, their urban settlement patterns remain substantially more 
concentrated than those of whites or Latinos”). 
 93. Id. at 4 n.7. 
 94. Id. at 22. 
[D]ata . . . show relatively high levels of population racial segregation. Whereas black 
households comprised a full 64 percent of Washington, D.C. households in 1990, that same 
group accounted for only about 6 percent of the households in suburban Fairfax County, 
Virginia. The Chicago area evidenced similarly high levels of racial segregation; there black 
households comprised 33 percent of the 1990 population of the City of Chicago, but only 1–3 
percent of households in DuPage County and the North Suburbs. In Los Angeles, black 
households accounted for 15 percent of the population of the City of L.A., but only a marginal 
2 percent of the households of suburban Orange and Ventura Counties. By contrast, Latino 
households were more uniformly represented among the geographic subdivisions of our 
sampled metropolitan areas. 
Id. at 4. 
 95. See PATILLO-MCCOY, supra note 19, at 216. 
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this country’s meritocratic myth: some have more wealth and privilege because 
they earned it. Moreover, class is not only something we are, it’s also something 
we do daily. This is because the middle class consciousness shapes so many 
things that we do daily in order to fit in to society. 
As an example, I was once pulled over for coasting my bike through a stop 
sign. The officer brusquely demanded to see my license. I handed her my 
Harvard ID, instead. Instantly, the police officer’s attitude changed. She 
became very polite and pleasant, explained the law I had broken, and gave me a 
ticket. What was I doing when I pulled out my Harvard identification? I was 
signaling to her that I was a different sort of black person, who need not be 
regarded as a threatening law breaker but who was entitled to more respectful 
treatment. Because I could clearly identify myself as a member of a certain 
“class,” I was entitled to a presumption that my mistake was an exception, not 
typical criminal behavior. What I did exemplifies how black people construct 
public identities in order to offset racial stigma and discriminatory treatment 
from white strangers.96 Yet later I wondered, what did other people do in such 
situations without such a powerful credential to temporarily deflect racial 
stigma and negative presumptions?97 
It is a fact of life for middle-class Blacks that they must “do” class. They 
must embrace a delicate paradox in order to protect what they have 
accumulated to defend against perceived and actual threats from strangers. 
Blacks navigate the complicated race and class world with the goal of avoiding 
racial hostility from Whites and opting out of black racial disadvantage 
whenever possible.98 Blacks who occupy the top ten percent of income earners 
live lives that are, according to standard economic indicators, indistinguishable 
from those of the white middle class.99 The key difference is that while Whites 
take their middle-class identity for granted, Blacks have to actively work to 
promote and establish their middle-class identity: “blacks who have ‘made it’ 
must work harder, more deliberately, and more consistently to make their 
 
 96. See Robin R. Means Coleman, The Gentrification of “Black” in Black Popular Communication 
in the New Millennium, 4 POPULAR COMM. 79, 91 (2006) (arguing that black popular culture is 
mistakenly belittled and devalued unless it is gentrified). 
 97. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Paul Torelli, An Empirical Analysis of “Acting White” 5 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11334, 2006) (“[E]mpirical patterns are most 
consistent with a simple model of peer pressure. The principal idea is that individuals face a two-
audience signaling quandary: signals that beget labor market success are signals that induce peer 
rejection. . . . ‘Acting white’ is more salient in public schools and schools in which the percentage of 
black students is less than twenty, but non-existent among blacks in predominantly black schools or 
those who attend private schools.”); id. at 36–37 (“[H]igh achieving students and students in 
environments with more interracial contact are most burdened by ‘acting white.”). 
 98. See KARYN R. LACY, BLUE CHIP BLACK: RACE, CLASS AND STATUS IN THE NEW BLACK 
MIDDLE CLASS 73 (2007). Another scholar refers to this racial performance as “covering” and observes 
that “the work of covering, unlike the work of conversion or passing, is imposed on all groups outside 
the mainstream.” Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 885 (2002). He demonstrates that, in 
particular, “racial minorities find themselves largely unprotected from demands to cover [in the areas 
of grooming and language].” Id. at 879. 
 99. See LACY, supra note 98, at 2, 73. 
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middle-class status known to others.”100 Class performance is an 
underappreciated way that Blacks alter some portion of the way their 
“Blackness” is perceived.101 The black middle-class identity is multi-dimensional: 
“The black middle-class identity is composed of public identities, status-based 
identities, racial and class-based identities, and suburban identities. Middle-class 
blacks employ these identities instrumentally to establish their position in 
American society relative to white strangers, their white middle-class neighbors, 
lower-class blacks and one another.”102 
Status-based identities are how one justifies one’s attitudes toward other 
groups.103 Public identities are how minority individuals protect against racism 
from Whites. Blacks use class-related strategies to protect themselves from 
racial discrimination.104 Class-related strategies require careful performance, 
largely by using material goods and by outward manifestations of mastery of 
white norms of speech and conducting oneself with high confidence that 
evidence high expectation for cordial treatment by others.105 Thus, one 
purchases goods, services, and clothing to project an appearance of affluence 
and to remove the stigma of poverty. Other class-based strategies include 
driving an appropriately upper-middle-class status automobile, displaying a 
university ID,106 or deploying other “cultural capital” such as manner of speech, 
diction, and self-presentation. Class performance includes adopting white (as 
opposed to black) cultural styles.107 Strategic assimilation involves a race- and 
class-based strategy to protect and preserve one’s middle-class identity by 
limiting one’s personal association with poor blacks. It includes “boundaries 
middle-class blacks erect against the white world (race-based identities), and 
the boundaries middle-class blacks draw against lower classes in the black world 
(class-based identities).”108 There is a class cleavage in the black community, but 
it is inadequate to view it purely as class. Because class is raced in the United 
States, and because class is legally invisible, each must instead be taken into 
account when discussing the other. 
The literature has long acknowledged an intersection between race and 
class,109 but there has been little actual exploration of the meaning of this 
interaction and its significance for antidiscrimination theory.110 Specifically, what 
 
 100. LACY, supra note 98, at 3. 
 101. Id. at 2–3. 
 102. Id. at 14 (elaborating on why public identities are necessary in a racialized society). 
 103. Id. at 73. 
 104. Id. at 113. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 129, 166. 
 106. Lacy, supra note 98, at 244 n.3. 
 107. Id. at 92. 
 108. Id. at 152. 
 109. See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 377–92 (2006) (calling for critical race 
theory to more meaningfully embrace class as an axis of analysis of material subordination). 
 110. One notable exception is powell’s recent tour de force description of how race and class are not 
mutually exclusive. See powell, supra note 3. 
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is race and how does class morph or elide racial identity? Race, as a human-
body distinction and category of disadvantaged or advantaged identity, has 
been extensively analyzed. Class, as a socioeconomic distinction and equally 
salient category of identity, has been less-thoroughly analyzed. One scholar, in 
particular, has forcefully rebutted the argument that class explains racial 
disadvantage and that developing a socially inclusive agenda requires taking 
class, instead of race, into account. 
Perhaps the most glaring flaw in our popular formulations of race and class is that they 
are assumed to be phenotypical markers on one hand, or economic locations a-
historically derived and a-contextually applied on the other. But class is more than 
annual income, just as race is more than skin color.111 
Nevertheless, though class is socially apparent, it is legally invisible.112 Class 
discrimination is widely accepted. Race and class are overlapping categories, 
primarily because class is racialized. The appearance of one’s body is often 
taken as an indication of one’s class. This is similar to an old concept of 
“whitening” or “honorary whiteness.”113 
Accordingly, race, as the central barrier to a black person’s opportunities, 
may change as class changes. Class is something that can be deployed in certain 
circumstances to deflect racial stigma and disadvantage suggests that race is 
inaccurately conceptualized as fixed or absolute. It might instead be only nearly 
fixed and nearly absolute, a slight albeit noteworthy shift signaling issues that 
might have to be faced fully if and when improvement in economic conditions 
for Blacks continues.114 Class is conceptualized or mythologized as fluid because 
it can be manipulated by acquisition of material things. But there might likewise 
be changes in the perception of one’s race as one travels through different strata 
of class. 
A deeper understanding of race teaches not that it has declined in 
significance, but that it has shifted in significance. “Blackness” has been 
disaggregated into acceptable and unacceptable components: some aspects 
associated with Blackness are reviled and celebrated, others fetishized and 
 
 111. powell, supra note 3, at 361. 
 112. Arguably there are legal disadvantages and advantages of class. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty’s protections for the single-family residential zone against the multifamily house protect 
financial security, social status and image, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (money is equated with 
free speech); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (declaring right to counsel in criminal cases); 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (ratifying wealth discrimination in education). 
 113. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 152–53, 155–
56 (2006) (explaining the phenomenon of honorary Whiteness as a current reality for nonwhite 
minorities in the United States. Lopez explains that this status is most accessible to those who are 
phenotypically similar to Whites). 
 114. The current financial crisis sadly suggests that this reality may yet be a dream deferred. The 
foreclosure crisis has disproportionately hit black and Latino communities. See Rachel D. Godsil & 
David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and The Ethic of 
Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 959–64 (2008) (detailing the severe negative impact of the 
mortgage crisis on minority homeowners); see also Mary M. Chapman, Black Workers Hurt by Detroit’s 
Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at A1 (reporting that autoworker layoffs are hitting black Americans 
the hardest). 
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denigrated, and still others co-opted and rejected. Similarly, Whiteness, as the 
category of people in the United States entitled to privilege, presumptions of 
intelligence, legitimacy, and innocence, has shifted as well. The experience of 
the black middle class suggests that Blacks can now adopt or manifest some 
components of the privileges formerly reserved to Whiteness. It used to be that, 
no matter what, Blacks could not find acceptance in white mainstream culture. 
Today, that is not the case. Education, accent, diction, material wealth, and 
material possessions are all proxies entitling one to some of the privileges and 
deference formerly reserved exclusively for Whites. Critical race theory argues 
that the structures of white supremacy are ever present. As a result of the 
disaggregation of some of the components of Whiteness, however, there has 
been a shift. This does not make members of the black middle class white. Nor 
does it make them think they are white. But to the extent a black individual can 
manifest certain signifiers, she steps into some of the privileges of Whiteness 
sometimes, in some places. She can be operatively white. 
VI 
THE BLACK–BLACK DIVERGENCE 
The civil rights movement was the worst thing that ever happened to us. That’s right—
the worst thing. Sure we got some rights, but it split our community apart.”115 
The black–white paradigm has been the crucial paradigm in the story of 
geographical patterns of housing and commerce. The concentrations of black 
minorities within distinct communities continue to this day, which necessarily 
means that the property demand in those neighborhoods is decreased. Because 
the real estate market in those neighborhoods doesn’t include Whites, the 
market demand is significantly reduced. Discussions of race are somewhat 
inadequate, though, because they follow particular, familiar patterns, focusing 
purely on a specific conception of the black–white paradigm. Yet it is 
worthwhile to consider that the distinctions based on race are accompanied by a 
powerful, racialized discourse of middle class versus poor in the land-use and 
development context. The black–white paradigm in exclusionary zoning, for 
example, involves the wealthy or middle-class white person (we need not even 
use the term white) protesting against or displacing the poor black person. (we 
also need not even use the term black). Another example of the racialized 
discourse of middle class versus poor is in the urban-gentrification context. The 
term “gentrification” suggests wealthier Whites displacing poor Blacks.116 Little 
attention has been paid to the significance of the increasing numbers of Blacks 
stepping into middle-class roles formerly held almost exclusively by Whites. 
 
 115. Steven Gregory, The Changing Significance of Race and Class in an African-American 
Community, 19 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 255, 272 n.8 (1992) (quoting a neighborhood activist and veteran of 
the civil-rights movement, after an NAACP meeting in East Elmhurst-Corona, Queens, New York). 
 116. See Freeman, supra note 78, at 122–23, 162–63 (discussing the perceptions and attitudes of 
black residents of historically black neighborhoods towards gentrification based on the growing 
presence of Whites in the community). 
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Because the problem has been oversimplified as involving affluent Whites 
displacing or excluding poor Blacks, the interaction of race with class has the 
inadvertent effect of normalizing economic discrimination and segregation. 
Understanding the role of “doing” class is important because it suggests 
exercising agency or control over shifting racial perceptions that should be 
accounted for. Following a detailed ethnographic study of a Queens, New York, 
neighborhood that experienced racial and class change, an anthropologist 
offered the provocative argument that state-sponsored reforms associated with 
civil-rights-era activism restructured political power in the black community: the 
focus of neighborhood activism shifted “from institutions and strategies that 
emphasized a race-based definition of political interests and identity toward 
those privileging the discourse and claims of the black middle class.”117 “[C]ivil 
rights era reforms,” he argued, “disproportionately empowered middle-class 
homeowners, enabling them to translate economic gains into political power 
and, in the process, to rearticulate the significance of race and class in 
community politics.”118 
One unavoidable fact is that middle class Blacks seek to avoid the 
disadvantages of poverty just as Whites do. Many Blacks who move to the 
suburbs do not want poor black kids in their children’s schools,119 revealing a 
divide in racial identity based on class. But middle class Blacks are less 
successful at getting away.120 This is because of structural racial disadvantage in 
geographically concentrated black ownership. The domino effects are 
communities with less retail, inferior services, less commercial services. Thus 
the black middle class are not as successful at protecting their turf as white 
middle class are. So in effect this is a racial disadvantage but certainly a 
paradoxical one. It involves a disadvantage in escaping the poor and 
disadvantage in exercising privilege at the expense of the poor. As long as our 
society says it is OK to have “have nots,” the society will be structured to allow 
people the illusion of escape. One scholar noted the racialized paradox of class 
illusion for blacks and observed, in 1957, 
[T]he black middle class embodies a love for the cultural values of white society, a 
rejection of the culture of the black masses and a keen awareness that they are 
themselves black and therefore, outside of the boundaries of the white community 
they strive to emulate. This paradoxical position leads the black middle class to a 
“deep-seated inferiority complex” and self-hatred which they attempt to resolve by 
constructing a “world of make-believe” to escape the disdain of whites and achieve[] 
their desired elite status.121 
 
 117. Gregory, supra note 115, at 256. 
 118. Id. at 255. 
 119. See Lacy, supra note 98, at 152 (discussing black middle-class protection of class-based 
identities). 
 120. See CASHIN, supra note 62, at 140 (describing the structural defects of geographically 
concentrated, black-owned neighborhoods). 
 121. E. FRANKLIN FRAIZER, BLACK BOURGEOIS 126 (1957) (quoted in Kesha Moore, What’s Class 
Got to Do With It? Community Development and Racial Identity, 27 J. URB. AFF. 437, 439 (2005)); see 
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Another scholar argues that this strongly negative view no longer applies, 
noting that the confusion over racial and class meaning is that being middle 
class is “raced” as white and poverty is raced as black. The black middle class is 
often accused of “acting white.”122 But this accusation is too simplistic, and it too 
easily dismisses what might be an undervalued, cogent explanation: conflicts 
between non-Whites over land use are also problems of racial discrimination. 
To disregard this explanation is to allow the racialized concept of class to be a 
way around the prohibition on racial discrimination. The legal standards of 
racial discrimination, both the “intentional racial discrimination” standard and 
the “disparate impact” standard, will fail to protect poor Blacks if class can be 
used as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, because in reality, it is every bit 
as racially invidious. This means that class distinctions are used to perpetuate 
racial disadvantage to do the work that racial classifications used to do. 
Why is the possibility of black-on-black racial discrimination worth 
considering? In the context of affordable housing, when Whites claim that they 
are not engaging in racial discrimination, but simply class discrimination, many 
Blacks are often skeptical,123 for the story and pervasiveness of racial 
discrimination are so sweeping and consistent.124 Yet, the reality of opposition to 
affordable housing, often involves a number of “complexities, nuances and 
ambiguities of community decisions about local land use changes . . .”125 The 
development of affordable housing is often a contest between conflicting 
assumptions, interests, and fears. Primarily, the contest is rooted in several 
interrelated factors that contribute to the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) 
reaction: fear of adverse impacts on property values, antigovernment sentiment, 
anti-poor sentiment, and racial prejudice and segregation.126 
But the history and present reality of racial segregation make it difficult, and 
likely naïve, to accept this kind of explanation. One of the disappointments of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has been that the objections of white 
homeowners are largely legally protected, even though these types of objections 
 
also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 129 (1978) (noting improvements 
in black occupations since 1940). 
 122. Moore, supra note 121, at 439. 
 123. See Rolf Pendall, Opposition to Housing: NIMBY and Beyond, 35 URB. AFF. REV. 112, 115 
(1999) (“Many white non-Hispanic Americans are prejudiced against minorities and can be expected to 
fight high-density and assisted housing for that reason. Such racist and classist anti-housing action—still 
a common occurrence—must be distinguished from other opposition to housing, if only because policy 
responses to prejudice-based opposition will differ markedly from those based on the real impacts of 
new housing on neighborhood quality.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3639 (2008). 
 125. C. Theodore Koebel, Robert E. Lang, & Karen A. Danielsen, Community Acceptance Of 
Affordable Housing, Report to the National Association of Realtors 11 (June 2004), available at 
http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/53c08d0048be37cab4a1fe0c8bc1f2ed/ 
koebellangfr.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=53c08d0048be37cab4a1fe0c8bc1f2ed. 
 126. Id. at 3 (“In some cases concern over adverse impacts may be a smokescreen for deeper 
conflicts over a just society and the role of government. But smokescreen or real, the fear of adverse 
impacts and questions about the benefits of affordable housing have to be addressed before increased 
levels of production can be achieved.”). 
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have long been strongly criticized for contributing to the racial segregation in 
metropolitan areas. Intentional racial discrimination is the legal standard; real-
world experience reveals, though, that the motivations, mechanisms for 
implementation, and methods of maintenance involve a complex intertwining of 
race- and class discrimination. Examining this issue through a purely racial lens 
misses a certain level of subordination that takes place based on class and 
financial circumstances. On the other hand, it might nevertheless be more 
consistent with existing subordination theory (and strategically advantageous) 
to consider a racially informed paradigm to address class issues. In other words, 
if we attempt to unwind the knot of complexity, we would still find race at its 
center. 
Few try to detangle the race and class issues in the current paradigm 
because intentional racial discrimination or disparate impact on race is usually 
present— and thus provides a clear-cut way to view and solve the problem. The 
reality is, though, that opposition to low-income people and housing happens 
within a structure of racial segregation and stigma such that a black poor person 
is never discriminated against solely on the basis of her class. Her black race is a 
physical signal of a stigmatized difference worsened by her class. While middle-
class Blacks are far from immune from racial stigma, class can have an opposite 
enhancing effect on their racial disadvantage, different from the experience of 
poor Blacks. 
VII 
THE DISAGGREGATION OF THE OPPRESSION OF SLAVERY AND PRIVILEGES 
RESERVED TO WHITES 
“Race and class acquired their meaning over time and are not comprehensible outside 
their historical social context.”127 
While this nation was founded upon ideal principles of liberty, freedom and 
equality, contradicted by an embrace of slavery and racial discrimination, there 
has been noteworthy progress in dismantling some unjust practices and 
techniques of oppression. Since the end of slavery and the Jim Crow era, Blacks 
and impoverishment have been synonymous. The success of antidiscrimination 
law has been, in part, to allow Blacks to throw off the fetters of aspects of overt 
discrimination and become self-sufficient, if not prosperous. For example, while 
a small black elite already existed at the turn of the century in the United 
States, its wealth and professions were severely limited: its members were 
relegated to service or working-class occupations.128 “[T]he second half of the 
twentieth century was a period of ‘steady and sweeping movement toward 
 
 127. powell, supra note 4, at 361. 
 128. Lacy, supra note 98, at 24–25 (citing BART LANDRY, THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 
(1987)). 
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general endorsement of the principles of racial equality and integration.’”129 
With the advent of the Civil Rights Acts in the 1960s, more and more Blacks 
have become relatively prosperous. College graduation, professional 
attainment, and social mobility have improved dramatically.130 
The significance of these class changes for the meaning of race have long 
been the subject of debate. For example, the famous debate between William 
Julius Wilson and traditional-civil-rights and critical-race-theory advocates has 
been about whether the significance of race has declined. This has led to current 
debates about race-based affirmative action, and whether race should be 
replaced by class as a criterion for school admissions. Those who refute calls for 
class-based remedies argue persuasively that class has been, and continues to 
be, a racialized concept in the United States. Racial meaning, identity, and 
practices have helped shape class identity and inhibit class consciousness.131 
Others argue that racial advantage and disadvantage, Blackness and Whiteness, 
continue to be a normal and ingrained feature of our landscape.132 Another 
scholar sees such concepts as artificial but purposeful constructs. “[W]hiteness 
as a theoretical construct evolved for the very purpose of racial exclusion . . . 
and racial subjugation. This fact was particularly evident during the period of 
the most rigid racial exclusion, as whiteness signified racial privilege and took 
the form of status property.”133 These explanations are helpful to understand 
racial disadvantage and advantage. Yet another theory is required in order to 
account for the significance and meaning of continued black educational and 
professional attainment and improved access to material wealth and to 
reconcile these with continuing disadvantage for so many other black people. 
Intraclass land-use conflicts make the divergence in interest uncomfortably 
apparent and beg for an explanation of how to understand and address the 
disjuncture. 
A significant aspect of the change in the allocation of social and economic 
oppression and privilege in the United States is that, historically, race was a 
primary (but not the only) method used to allocate citizenship, rights, and 
resources.134 This overt, explicit system has been converted by civil-rights laws 
providing a variety of contextual laws prohibiting racial discrimination. Non-
Whites (principally Blacks) received formal guarantees of nondiscrimination 
and “equal opportunity” in public accommodations, housing, education, and 
 
 129. Charles, supra note 90, at 48 (quoting Lawrence Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the 
Close of the Twentieth Century, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR 
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employment. These laws have, over time, led to significant changes in the 
system of allocation of privilege and disadvantage in the U.S. opportunity 
structure. Rights and privileges formerly reserved by law exclusively to Whites 
have been made available, first on paper and increasingly more in reality, to 
non-Whites. 
In the twenty-first century, the privileges of Whiteness and the oppression of 
slavery have been broken up and disaggregated into discrete, exchangeable 
components. For example, slavery, the most complete form of oppression, 
entailed ownership of the black person’s entire body. Race was a key concept 
used to support slavery. But with the end of slavery and its absolute oppression 
based on race and the end of Jim Crow, improvements in conditions for Blacks 
have taken place alongside some very sobering negative developments. The 
oppression of slavery and Jim Crow is not gone; instead, it has been 
disaggregated and reassembled into more efficient components of oppression. 
First, the dramatic rise in black incarceration, fueled mainly by incarceration 
of drug addicts, has had disastrous effects on the families and neighborhoods of 
this dramatically expanded prisoner class.135 By virtue of their criminal records, 
and the resulting unemployability, members of this prisoner class are 
permanently relegated to economic poverty and marginalization. An under-
considered legacy of this expanded prisoner class is that most black men are 
presumed to be members. One researcher found that a black former prisoner 
had no chance of employment, while a white former prisoner had an impaired, 
but not foreclosed ability to get a job. A black man with a clean criminal record 
had an equivalent ability as the white former prisoner to get employment. In 
the researcher’s words, “being a black man was like having a felony 
conviction.”136 
Today, ownership and control of the body is premised on criminality, with 
such ownership and control managed by for-profit prison industries that market 
prison services and sell prisoner labor, reminiscent of the Jim Crow chain-gang 
era in the early twentieth century.137 Ownership and control of the body was an 
inefficient system of acquiring labor. It required some minimal care, housing, 
and upkeep of the enslaved person’s body in order to preserve its commodity 
value. Today, however, “independent contractor” theories allow employers to 
maintain exploitative labor relationships with low-wage workers such as those 
in food processing, migrant workers, and others without the obligation to care 
for the worker. Low wages are the extent of the employer’s obligation. The end 
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of slavery did not end exploitative work relationships, nor did it end racially 
discriminatory injustice and subordination. 
Another example of the disaggregation of the oppression of slavery into a 
more-flexible and efficient form of subordinating oppression is the poor’s utter 
indebtedness and vulnerability to predatory lending, and the curtailment of 
bankruptcy laws to prevent escape from this debt, creating a new, permanent 
form of debtor’s prison. Race has been, and continues to be, a reality, but it has 
shifted such that Whiteness and Blackness are as much a matter of identity as 
functional components of privileges and oppression. 
VIII 
THE DISAGGREGATION OF PRIVILEGE FORMERLY RESERVED TO WHITES 
Helped by prohibitions on employment discrimination, a notable black 
middle class has emerged. Though there is yet room for much improvement, it 
is undeniable that, with improved access to education and a growing norm of 
diversity, access to public and private employment has improved. How does the 
black middle class and fit into a discourse about race and class? The struggles of 
the black middle class are unique, and it is worthwhile to consider the context 
within which they have “succeeded.” The legacy of Whiteness was supported by 
an explicit, absolute ideology of white supremacy, but has become a more 
invisible and flexible white norm. The legacy of Whiteness led to a structural 
white supremacy in the form of wealth,138 racially-identified space and network 
effects,139 and normalcy and innocence.140 For example, white is the norm for 
“middle classness,” desirability as a retail shopper, homebuyer, and employee. 
Another aspect of the white norm is the cloak of invisibility it provides for 
structural white privilege and structural black disadvantage. The arguments 
against affirmative action can be seen as white privilege denial, Whites’ fierce 
attachment to the meritocracy myth in defense of a standard that advantages 
them. 
Racialized concepts of Blackness and Whiteness led to a rhetorical legacy of 
an individualist ideology and neoliberal approach to the economy and 
government. Societal institutions that were conceived within a racial context141 
now operate in a context of ostensible racial blindness or invisibility, when in 
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fact race is quite perceptible and is used to form everyday meanings of 
inclusion, acceptability, and desirability. This has led to current debates about 
race-based affirmative action and whether race should be replaced by class as a 
criterion for school admissions.142 
For many people and places, the old racial order continues to exist. Massive 
structural unemployment of millions of black people, continued racial 
segregation in neighborhoods, and incarceration driven by the drug trade and 
violent crime still plague the black population. Infant mortality and life-
expectancy rates are dismal indicators of marginalization and structural 
disadvantage. Though the practices have changed, the structures of oppression 
and injustice continue, reshaped into more sophisticated, invisible, and 
normalized forms of injustice. 
How do we as a society make sense of these incredibly wide divergences in 
conditions in the United States? How do they exist simultaneously? The 
examples suggest that the oppression once known as slavery has been 
disaggregated and reconstituted into individualized and flexible components of 
oppression. Similarly, the privileges formerly reserved to Whites have been 
disaggregated and reconstituted into individualized and exchangeable 
components of privilege. It is impossible to precisely identify how many 
components each American citizen gets, but many get more privilege than 
others while some certainly get more components of oppression than would be 
considered fair in any rational assessment. 
Regarding the reality of the disaggregation of oppression and privilege in 
the context of the examples of what the black middle class does to avoid or 
deflect racial hostility, the New Orleans example illustrates that the right to 
exclude and class homogeneity is what one is supposed to get from suburban 
membership. Yet black homeowners, as a whole, get neither the ability to 
exclude nor the benefits of economic homogeneity. Thus, the fundamental issue 
raised by the black middle-class paradox is whether the black middle class can 
participate in the structures that disadvantage and discriminate against poor 
Blacks without participating in white supremacy. Because the racialized 
geography of exclusion is based on economically subordinating landscapes, it 
seems the black middle class may gain from the privileges of middle-class 
homeownership, but at the expense of less affluent blacks. 
Thus within the U.S. legacy of the continued white norm, Black 
suburbanites and gentrifiers can be, under certain circumstances, “operatively 
white.” The civil-rights era ended de jure discrimination, but still left us with 
race consciousness and race discrimination in fact. Slavery and racial meaning 
themselves have been disaggregated into discrete components of privilege and 
oppression.143 The black middle class accedes to some of the privileges formerly 
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reserved to Whiteness. White norms are often the means of external (and 
sometimes internal) measures of success, trustworthiness, accomplishment, 
intelligence, employability, and legitimacy. Blacks who model “upscale” 
behaviors lead a different existence than the black poor. Blacks with class step 
into an individualistic, merit-based system, conceived upon race and the 
absence of Blackness. Being operatively white does not make one white. But if 
the components of Whiteness are disaggregated and available for acquisition at 
certain times and in certain contexts, Blacks can step into some of the privileges 
formerly reserved for Whiteness in certain contexts, if only for a period of time. 
IX 
THE PROBLEM OF RACIAL EQUALITY WITHIN A STRUCTURE OF RACE AND 
CLASS EXCLUSION 
What is the significance of being operatively white? The answer is not clear, 
but a few preliminary observations can be made. Most compelling is that the 
presence of the black middle class is used to excuse the disadvantage or 
displacement of the black poor. The black middle class steps into an 
individualistic, racialized structure, one premised and conceived upon race. The 
presence of Black gentrifiers is used to avoid the fact that transformation is 
race-based or that the structural problems exist at all. For class purposes, Black 
gentrifiers are tokens whose presence has the unfortunate result of obscuring 
the racial dimension of gentrification. 
Since racial identity and subordination are part of conceptions and realities 
of class in the United States, the reality is that Blacks suffer in the aggregate 
under a solely class-based criterion. A race-based criterion is similarly 
inadequate, although it is likely to benefit members of racial minorities who are 
the most comparatively advantaged. Race and class, taken together, are meant 
to prioritize the interests of the least economically advantaged: the black poor. 
Thus, race and class, taken together, begin to acknowledge that there is a 
disjuncture within the black community, that some Blacks are more 
disadvantaged than others. 
Mary Patillo’s multi-year ethnographic study of a gentrifying neighborhood 
in Chicago illustrates that the interests of the black middle class and the black 
poor are in tension, but black professionals often play an important middle-man 
role. They bridge the divide between downtown and the neighborhood by 
deploying their ability to communicate in ways that power elites will respond to, 
and they are instrumental in securing increased resources for the black 
community. Patillo notes, however, that the decisions and interests of black 
professionals will often be at odds with the interests of lower-income neighbors. 
For example, Patillo supported a redevelopment proposal that would reduce 
the number of affordable housing units within a proposed development. She 
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argued that, in order for there to be a meaningful and beneficial connection 
between the black professional newcomers and the lower-income existing black 
residents, there must first be a heightened consciousness of the divergence in 
interests. This consciousness at least requires understanding, on the part of 
middle-class Blacks, that what may be in their interests will come at the expense 
of the interests of the poor.144 Patillo observes that “as a result of moving into 
schools, institutions, and occupations from which they were once barred, blacks 
have forged legitimate alliances with powerful white elites.”145 
“One consequence of this success is that black professionals have the capacity either 
to marginalize or to broker.” The tendency to do the former is tempered by the fact 
that blacks of all classes share worldviews that are shaped by their common historical 
experience. The overall lesson is that, in defining the black community and its 
interests, “the middle is the place where the actual face-to-face work of inequality 
transpires.”146 
Though Patillo concludes that there is harmony within seeming intraracial 
conflicts, the reality is that there will be stark disputes that will have to be 
resolved, whether by treating intraracial class conflicts as invisible, and merely 
cognizable as class, or by recognizing them as racial, in the legal language for 
unacceptable discrimination. 
The sobering problem in the quest for racial equality is that the black 
middle class cannot “overcome” so long as racialized class discrimination is 
embedded in the social and geographic landscape. Otherwise, the black middle 
class is put in the position of reinforcing a structure of race and class exclusion. 
Race discrimination is the moral claim of our time, and the structurally 
embedded nature of race should not be ignored simply because Blacks may be 
on both sides of the conflict. 
X 
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the significance of class within a societal structure 
of the white norm, where normalcy, wealth, advantage, and presumptions of 
innocence are all predicated on Whiteness. 
Behind the mask of a class-based logic, the current system of land use 
actually values Whiteness. Even more problematic is that Whiteness, as a 
standard, embeds concepts of privilege in the law that come at the expense of 
others. Whiteness and class discrimination skew public policies, resulting in 
extreme poverty, suffering, and negative effects based on neoliberal, 
individualistic ideology. So long as things are so skewed, we will all be running 
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away from those afflicted by the disadvantages and struggle of poverty, and, due 
to the logic of race, Blacks will be running from themselves.147 
The concept of “operatively white” allows scholars to more precisely 
identify the divergence of interests in certain contexts based on class, to 
highlight the need to update antidiscrimination law, to protect against 
subordinating the disadvantaged regardless of skin color, and to force the black 
middle class to confront the paradox of privilege in a racialized world. This 
privilege can come at the expense of those many purport to care about. Though 
the black middle class may have broken down barriers to get where it is, the 
racialized nature of those barriers means that the only way ahead—the only 
way to achieve the American dream—will be at the expense of others. In light 
of the unique position of the black middle class, we can begin to question the 
unquestioned and unchallenged privileges of class so that class cannot be used 
to excuse or obscure new forms of racial discrimination and subordination. 
In particular, we must begin to confront the obstacles that embedded class 
discrimination presents. These obstacles are key to the next stage of the racial-
justice project. By allowing ourselves to consider intraracial conflict (or, let us 
say, divergences), we begin to explore what it means to take class into account 
in our racial discussion. It must be noted, however, that one great difficulty of 
focusing on the black middle class is that the claim of many to that 
socioeconomic status is tenuous, for the current economy is less than stable. We 
are now on the brink of allowing race to collapse back into class again. During 
the recent time of prosperity through debt, we witnessed a more widespread 
separation of race from class—but that was largely illusory. As the moment of 
prosperity ends, we must examine the economic gains enjoyed by many Blacks 
and learn what they have to teach us about the strange relationship between 
race and class in the United States—that race and class are separate axes of 
status, power relations, and identity. Though race is not synonymous with class, 
class is a significant aspect of the advantages or disadvantages of race. 
The admitted limit of this theory is that the economic position of the black 
middle class is tenuous, not just because of a fragile economy. Its members are 
overly concentrated in public-sector employment, often live in neighborhoods 
that border black-ghetto neighborhoods, and they are often connected by 
family and daily living to the plight of poorer Blacks. Nevertheless, to the extent 
we hope that a stable middle class will continue to improve, and to the extent 
this group continues to diverge from a significant portion of other black people, 
we need to come up with a paradigm to handle disadvantageous actions taken 
by the more-powerful group. Until class becomes an independent, prohibited 
criterion for discrimination, the concept of operative Whiteness will 
increasingly become an imperfect but necessary substitute. 
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